On January 29, 1863, General Ulysses S. Grant assumed command of the Union forces tasked with seizing Vicksburg, Mississippi. This crucial objective was the last Confederate stronghold on the Mississippi River, a linchpin for their supply lines and communication with western territories. The complete control of the Mississippi River was paramount for the National Government, as it would effectively cleave the Confederacy in two, significantly accelerating the end of the Civil War.
The strategic importance of Vicksburg cannot be overstated. Perched atop high bluffs, it offered formidable natural defenses, further enhanced by Confederate fortifications under Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton. Traditional military doctrine suggested a gradual approach, establishing strong bases and advancing systematically. However, such a cautious strategy would have necessitated withdrawing Union troops from their current positions, a move Grant deemed politically untenable given the prevailing national sentiment.
The Weight of Public Opinion and Grant’s Resolve
The political landscape in the North in 1862 was fraught with discouragement. Recent elections had gone against the government, voluntary enlistments had plummeted, and a draft had been instituted, fueling the growth of the peace party. Recognizing this grave situation, General Grant, with the acumen of a statesman, made a resolute decision: he would not withdraw his army. Instead, he committed to “press forward to a decisive victory.” This unwavering determination would define the next five months of the campaign, culminating in the fall of the great Mississippi stronghold.
Initial Union efforts to reach Vicksburg from the north through canals and bayous proved futile, just as Grant had anticipated. These winter-long endeavors highlighted the impregnable nature of the northern approaches and underscored the need for a radically different strategy. Grant, ever the innovator, conceived a bold plan to move his army across the Mississippi River to the eastern bank, south of Vicksburg.
Grant’s Daring Flanking Maneuver
This audacious strategy required the Union fleet to run the gauntlet of Confederate batteries at Vicksburg, a perilous undertaking that was successfully accomplished. Simultaneously, Grant marched his army down the west bank of the river, bypassing Confederate defenses. A vital diversionary attack by Major General William T. Sherman at Haines’ Bluff, north of Vicksburg, ensured that Pemberton’s forces remained fixed in their fortifications, unaware of Grant’s true intent.
On April 26, 1863, Grant began ferrying his troops across the river, landing them at Bruinsburg, Mississippi. Reflecting on this pivotal moment, Grant remarked, “When this was effected, I felt a degree of relief scarcely ever equaled since. Vicksburg was not yet taken, it is true, nor were its defenders demoralized by any of our previous movements. I was now in the enemy’s country, with a vast river and the stronghold of Vicksburg between me and my base of supplies, but I was on dry ground, on the same side of the river with the enemy.” This strategic move placed him firmly in Confederate territory, cutting him off from his traditional supply lines but giving him the initiative.
The Inland Campaign: A Masterclass in Maneuver Warfare
Grant faced a numerically superior enemy, with approximately 60,000 Confederate troops under Pemberton at Vicksburg and Haines’ Bluff, and additional forces near Jackson, 50 miles to the east. Grant, with around 33,000 men, understood that success hinged on defeating these disparate Confederate forces separately and in detail before they could unite. He wasted no time in executing his plan.
Battles Leading to Jackson
- Port Gibson (May 1, 1863): Grant’s forces swiftly engaged and defeated a Confederate detachment near Port Gibson, securing a crucial foothold on the eastern bank.
- Grand Gulf: After Port Gibson, Grant advanced to Grand Gulf, initially planning to establish it as a supply base. However, discovering he would face a month-long delay awaiting reinforcements from General Nathaniel P. Banks at Port Hudson, Grant made another decisive break from convention.
Abandoning the idea of Grand Gulf as a base, and now reinforced by Sherman’s corps, Grant plunged deeper into the interior. His army moved in the lightest marching order, carrying only ammunition. This radical departure from conventional logistics meant sacrificing wagon trains and most munitions, but it enabled unparalleled speed – a critical factor for success. This decision underscored Grant’s military genius, his ability to discern when established military axioms could and should be set aside for strategic advantage.
The Capture of Jackson
Pressing eastward, Grant’s forces encountered and defeated a Confederate force of seven to eight thousand men at Raymond. Continuing his swift advance, he fought another skirmish at Clinton before marching on Jackson, the capital of Mississippi and a vital Confederate supply base. There, he engaged General Joseph Johnston, who had arrived to take command of all Confederate forces in the region. Johnston, with approximately 11,000 men, was quickly defeated. The capture of Jackson was a significant victory, as Grant destroyed valuable factories and munitions and gained control of the essential railroad line connecting Jackson to Vicksburg.
Pemberton’s Misstep and Champion Hill
While Grant was occupied in Jackson, an intercepted message revealed that Pemberton, under Johnston’s orders, was moving eastward from Vicksburg with 25,000 men to confront him. Instead of a direct approach, Pemberton initially turned south, hoping to sever Grant’s line of communication. Grant, with grim humor, noted, “I had no line of communication to break.” This misdirection proved costly for Pemberton, granting Grant precious time to consolidate his victory in Jackson.
After this wasted maneuver, Pemberton eventually resumed his eastward march as initially ordered. However, Grant was more than prepared. Leaving Jackson, he rapidly marched westward, intercepting Pemberton at Champion Hill. Here, with forces nearly matched, a brutal four-hour battle ensued. Grant decisively routed Pemberton’s army, narrowly missing the opportunity to capture the entire Confederate force. With his army broken, Pemberton retreated towards Vicksburg.
The Big Black River Bridge
Grant pursued relentlessly, engaging Pemberton’s rear guard at the Big Black River. Another sharp engagement resulted in a Confederate defeat, clearing the path for Grant to cross the river. The very next day, Grant’s army stood before the formidable fortifications of Vicksburg, with Pemberton’s shattered forces trapped inside.
Defying Orders, Securing Victory
From the moment Ulysses S. Grant crossed the Mississippi River at Bruinsburg, he had operated without direct communication from Washington. It was not until May 11, during the Battle of Big Black River Bridge, that an officer arrived with an order from General Henry W. Halleck instructing Grant to return to Grand Gulf and cooperate with General Banks against Port Hudson. Grant’s response was legendary: the order came too late. “The bearer of the dispatch insisted that I ought to obey the order and was giving arguments to support the position when I heard a great cheering to the right of our line and, looking in that direction, saw General Michael Lawler, in his shirt-sleeves, leading a charge on the enemy. I immediately mounted my horse, rode toward the charge, and saw no more of the officer who delivered the message, not even today.” By the time Grant reached Vicksburg on May 18, the authorities in Washington recognized the monumental achievements in Mississippi and rescinded any notions of recalling him.
The Siege and Surrender of Vicksburg
Upon arriving at Vicksburg, initial assaults on the heavily fortified city were repulsed with significant Union losses. Recognizing the strength of the defenses, Grant settled into a protracted siege. President Abraham Lincoln and General Halleck, now fully appreciative of Grant’s successes, provided ample reinforcements without him even needing to ask. Within a short time, Grant commanded 70,000 men. His siege lines became impregnable, making any Confederate breakout attempt impossible. Although Johnston had regrouped forces to the east, an assault on the reinforced Union army was unfeasible.
Tighter and tighter, Grant drew his lines around Vicksburg. Inside the city, suffering intensified for both soldiers and civilians. Finally, on July 4, 1863, Vicksburg surrendered. This momentous victory gave the National forces complete control of the Mississippi River from its source to its mouth, effectively splitting the Confederacy. Coincidentally, on the very same day, General Robert E. Lee suffered a decisive defeat at Gettysburg. These two colossal Union victories delivered a crushing blow to the Rebellion, though much hard fighting still lay ahead.
Conclusion: A Campaign of Unparalleled Brilliance
Grant’s Vicksburg Campaign stands as a testament to his strategic genius and audacity, often compared to Napoleon’s Ulm campaign. It was arguably the most brilliant single campaign of the entire war. With a numerically inferior force, Grant boldly abandoned traditional lines of communication, moved rapidly through challenging terrain, and skillfully engaged the enemy’s superior forces along the Jackson-Vicksburg corridor. He decisively crushed Johnston’s forces before Pemberton could link up, and then flung Pemberton’s broken army back into Vicksburg before Johnston could recover. At every turn, Grant demonstrated superior tactical prowess and leadership, winning every engagement against superior numbers. Measured by the skill displayed and the profound results achieved, there is arguably no campaign in American history that offers a more compelling study in military strategy and deserves greater admiration.
